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In the Body of the Beholder: Herder’s Aesthetics and Classical Sculpture 
Helen Slaney 
ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν.1 
 
 As we have seen in the introduction to this volume (pp. 000, 000), the Pygmalion 
trope had particular conceptual currency in the latter half of the eighteenth century.2 Although 
in Ovid the statue is fashioned from ebur, ivory, contemporary depictions including a 
sculptural realisation by Étienne-Maurice Falconet (fig. 1) showed her in marble, referencing 
the dominant medium associated with antiquity at the time. Following the lead of 
Winckelmann, contemporary conceptions of classical Greece were regularly shaped around a 
canon of sculpture.3  A host of historians, critics, and philosophers embraced the pure beauty, 
the Schönheit, which classical sculptures appeared to embody.4  Among them Johann 
Gottfried Herder paid particular attention to the aesthetic mechanisms by which such beauty 
was perceived. Platt and Squire in the previous chapter examined the tactile appeal of 
sculpture in antiquity (pp xx-xx), a sensuality which may likewise be found in Herder’s 
approach to three-dimensional artwork. 
Although typically placed among the visual arts,5 it is only through touch, according 
to Herder, that sculpture is fully appreciated: as music appeals to the ears and painting to the 
eyes, sculpture, as die schöne Kunst des Gefühls (“the fine art for touch”), corresponds to “the 
                                                 
1 ‘The soul is like a hand.’ Aristotle, De Anima 432a1. 
2 On Galatea as eighteenth-century icon, see Joshua (2001: 31–51); on the use of the motif by Condillac, see 
Gaiger (2002: 13). 
3 See Pearce (1992) on the synecdochic function of museum objects as representatives of their source culture. 
4 Sculptural metaphor played a significant role in the idealising construction of ancient Greece, from 
Winckelmann and Lessing through to Goethe, Schiller, A.W. Schlegel, and Hegel. See Malsch (1990) on 
Herder’s place in this tradition. On other aspects of German philhellenism at this time, see e.g. Butler (1935)  
more recently, Marchand (2003) Guthenke (2008) and Billings (2014) & (2016). . 
5 Candlin (2010); cf. Boden (2000) and Platt & Squire, this volume, pp xx.  
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sense which perceives things in depth”.6 Herder does not mean that it is necessary to make 
physical contact with the artwork in question, and indeed implies that this would short-circuit 
the work’s effects. Rather, by attending scrupulously to the sensations occurring in your own 
body as a result of its proximity, you can tune into and cultivate the haptic frisson activated 
by encountering any three-dimensional form.7 As I will show in this essay, Herder’s theory of 
fühlende Einbildung, or the ‘feeling imagination’, anticipates current neurocognitive models 
of haptic perception. Of particular relevance are the findings of Marc Jeannerod concerning 
the neural processing of pragmatic affordances, or the action-centred properties of objects. 
According to Jeannerod and others, perceiving an object visually has been shown to activate 
simulations of potential kinetic engagement.8 
This simple act of activation may be pleasurable in itself,9 but Herder is particularly 
concerned with what constitutes Schönheit (“pure beauty”): what it consists of, how to 
recognise it, and what to do with it when it confronts you.10 To this end, his essays Plastik: 
einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions bildendem Traume 
(“Sculpture: some observations on shape and form from Pygmalion’s creative dream”) and 
Kritische Wäldchen 4 (“Fourth Critical Grove”) concentrate on the sculptural forms 
considered at the time to epitomise artistic perfection, namely the collections of 
anthropomorphic Graeco-Roman statues on display in Florence and Rome. Herder had not 
yet visited Italy when he wrote these essays, whose insights into the interdependence of the 
senses are supposedly predicated on direct contact with peerless masterpieces. On the 
                                                 
6 Kritische Wäldchen 4 (“Fourth Critical Grove”) 2.3; Moore (2006: 216). All translations of Kritische 
Wäldchen 4 are from Moore (2006) unless otherwise indicated.  
7 As Moore (2006: 15) observes, “Herder does not mean to suggest that we best appreciate sculptural form by 
groping the marble with our eyes shut… The mind imaginatively recuperates the three-dimensionality of the 
object on the basis of ideas such as mass and extension originally furnished by touch”.  
8 See discussion below, pp xx-xx. 
9 Engaging with sculpture is a “psychotropic mechanism” as defined by Smail (2008): a deliberate modification 
of behaviour resulting in neurochemical change.  
10 Defining beauty was the central project of eighteenth-century aesthetics, but Herder’s innovation was to focus 
not on the characteristics of the object but the process of observation itself. See discussion in Norton (1991). 
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contrary, it was via casts and copies that Herder developed his theory of touch as the sense 
through which we access the plastic realisation of beauty. Kritische Wäldchen 4, although it 
remained unpublished until after Herder’s death, was written in 1769, and its implications for 
sculpture developed more fully over the succeeding decade to be published in 1779 as 
Plastik. It was not until 1788 that Herder, in emulation of his friend and colleague Goethe, set 
out for Italy, ardent for a cultural consummation that remained elusive.11 Plastik’s manifesto 
represents a response to contemporary aesthetic theory refracted through Winckelmann as 
much as it represents phenomenological experience.12 Nevertheless, it also represents a 
crucial moment in the reception of classical sculpture and a self-reflexive treatment of the 
sensory engagement this art-form invites. 
 
******** 
Every sculpture is an installation of sorts, and installations solicit performative participation 
from their attendees. Do you “attend” a sculpture? You would certainly attend to a sculpture, 
or in Herder’s version, attend to its co-presence in your kinaesphere, the area you can 
potentially encompass by moving. Although touch is commonly regarded as involving skin-
to-surface contact with objects or environments, particularly through the hands and fingers, 
this is only one aspect of haptic perception. As well as registering pressure, temperature, and 
pain in the cutaneous receptors, the somatosensory system also processes a range of data 
from around the body. This includes proprioceptive information concerning the position of 
joints and muscles, and the closely related sense of kinaesthesia or one’s own movement.13 In 
                                                 
11 Knoll (1990). 
12  The seminal works of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, “Thoughts on the imitation of Greek works in painting 
and sculpture” (1755) and History of the Art of Antiquity (1764) established Greek art as the ideal paradigm. 
Herder was also aware of Lessing’s response in Laocoön (1766). On Herder’s reception of Winckelmann, see 
Harloe (2013: 205–43).  
13 It also includes the vestibular system, responsible for maintaining balance and measuring acceleration, and the 
usually imperceptible regulation of body chemistry. See Damasio (1999), Berthoz (2000), and Millar (2008) on 
the components of the somatosensory system. For definitions of touch incorporating all haptic senses, see 
Paterson (2007: passim) and Candlin (2010: 5); also Sheets-Johnstone quoted in Gallagher (2005: 7 n. 3). 
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conjunction with vision, haptic awareness enables an organism to judge object properties 
such as proximity, velocity, and mass in order to perform complex sensorimotor operations 
like crossing a busy road, or carving marble, or catching a ball. Because any action, even an 
act of perception, involves synthesising sensorimotor data with input from other modalities, 
the isolation of one “sense” from another is somewhat artificial.14 The profound contribution 
of touch to human experience has only recently been recognised, however, particularly in 
comparison to the longstanding fetish for vision dominating philosophical and critical 
discourse, and therefore re-engaging with haptic aesthetics offers a valuable counterweight.15 
For this reason, I have chosen to refer to the “beholder” of sculpture throughout because the 
term’s formality imparts more structure to the transaction than the less active role of 
“viewer”, which also carries unwelcome ocularcentric connotations; moreover, the 
(etymologically related) beholder holds the object in his field of awareness, much as the 
German Begriff (concept) is “grasped” (begriffen). Herder’s definition of touch incorporates 
factors now recognised as integral elements of haptic perception: spatial dynamics, object 
affordances, kinaesthesia, and motor memory. Touch, as Herder realised, spreads throughout 
the entire body and suffuses every living moment. 
It also informs cognitive processing. Plastik opens with a summary of Diderot’s 
“Letter on the blind for the use of those who can see” (1749), a defence of the sense of touch 
against the prevailing association of vision with abstract thought and “higher” reasoning. 
Like Herder, Diderot subscribed to the empiricist position that human knowledge was 
acquired through sense experience, rather than generated by a disembodied faculty of 
                                                 
14 Millar (2008: 43, 113) on spatial intermodality; Berthoz (2000: 5) on kinaesthesia. See further Butler & 
Purves (2013) on cross-sensory experience in the ancient world.  
15 There is a growing interest in touch in sensory history, e.g. Classen (2012). This is not confined to modernity; 
as Porter (2010: 8) argues, “Materialism is an essential component of aesthetic reflection in antiquity from its 
earliest origins”. 
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reason.16 Diderot’s contention was that congenitally blind individuals conceptualise the world 
using tactile and motor representations that function like mental “images” but differ in their 
modal content. He uses this hypothesis to address the so-called “Molyneux Question”, first 
posed in a letter to John Locke in 1688. Molyneux had asked whether a man blind from birth 
who had regained his sight as an adult would be able to distinguish a cube from a sphere by 
vision alone, or whether he could only tell which was which by handling them. Diderot, like 
Herder (and Locke), reached a negative conclusion: touch and sight register different 
properties, and “it is by experience alone that we learn to compare our sensations with what 
occasions them”.17 
Herder sets out in Kritische Wäldchen 4 (KW4) to develop an inductive theory of 
aesthetics, refuting the position expressed in Riedel’s Theorie der schönen Künste (“Theory 
of the Fine Arts”, 1767) that the human mind possesses an innate sense of what is beautiful. 
On the contrary, Herder argues, beauty is an acquired taste, and taste “a habitual application 
of our judgement to objects of beauty”.18 Judgement is the product of long-term repeated 
exposure to a range of comparable stimuli, until the process of sensual apprehension becomes 
so abbreviated that the beholder is no longer aware it has taken place, and attributes his 
resulting aesthetic preferences to a nonexistent faculty of rational, natural discrimination.19 
Such preferences can only be developed by making intensive, extensive comparisons between 
the objects in a given category (such as anthropomorphic marble sculpture/s) and 
extrapolating criteria for ranking these comparisons. Taste takes practice; practice makes both 
perfect and imperfect, as these values do not precede the studied application of perception. 
Your ability to perceive beauty, then, requires cultivation, and the instrument recommended 
                                                 
16 For contextualisation of Herder’s thought in eighteenth-century aesthetic and empiricist philosophy, see 
Norton (1991: esp. 155–232); Moore (2006: 1–30); Gaiger (2002: 6–15). 
17 In the original: C’est l’expérience seule qui nous apprend à comparer les sensations avec ce qui les 
occasionne (Trans. Adams 1999).   
18 KW4, 1.6; Moore (2006: 199). 
19 Ibid. 1.5; Moore (2006: 196–7). 
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by Herder as a tool for cultivating this sense within the body, carving it into the psyche, is 
antique sculpture, “the works of Phidias and Lysippus”.20  
The habit of aesthetic discrimination can be developed to the point of becoming 
“second nature” (wird Fertigkeit, wird Gewohnheit, wird Natur)21 because of the way in 
which our senses learn to grasp the world and convert its maelstrom of stimuli into 
meaningful data. This is the crux of Herder’s association of sculpture with touch. The 
medium’s intrinsic properties, those which distinguish it from other art forms (and in 
particular from painting), its volume and depth, solidity and mass, contour and curvature, its 
alteration of the space it occupies and the pressure its presence exerts on the matter around it, 
are held in common by all three-dimensional objects; but we are only aware that these 
properties exist because we have previously experienced their tactile effects on our bodies. “It 
is only by a habitual abbreviation (Verkürzung)”, Herder writes, “that we see bodies as 
surfaces and fancy that we recognise through sight what in childhood we properly learned 
very slowly, only by way of touch”.22  
Shaun Gallagher has shown that Diderot and Herder were right, but for the wrong 
reasons. The assumption that infants cannot interpret their visual field until they corroborate 
it tactually is incorrect;23 however, “continued visual experience after birth is necessary for 
the proper and continued development of neurons in the visual cortex… [and] deprivation of 
experience through the critical period would cause degradation of that initial structure”.24 In 
other words, the infant is born with all the equipment for intermodal perception, but if vision 
                                                 
20 Ibid 2.12; Moore (2006: 281).  
21 Ibid 1.5; Moore (2006: 199). 
22 Ibid 2.1, Moore (2006: 209). In the original: Es ist bloss eine gewohnheitsmässige Verkürzung, dass wir 
Körper als Flächen sehen, und das durch das Gesicht zu erkennen glauben, was wir würklich in unserer 
Kindheit, nicht anders als durchs Gefühl und sehr langsam lernten. Compare the more synaesthetic elision of 
vision and touch discussed by Platt & Squire, this volume. 
23 Imitation of facial expressions occurs from birth: Gallagher (2005: 74–5); the infant may have no choice but 
to imitate the expression, if development of mirror neurons precedes that of the inhibitory reflex. Cf. Jeannerod 
(1994: 200). 
24 Gallagher (2005: 165). 
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is not exercised in conjunction with other senses at each stage of development, their 
integration will not be sustained. Moreover, while infants can recognise objects without prior 
tactile contact,25 their comprehension of these objects’ use-value is acquired by practising the 
associated motor skills.26 The haptic properties of objects (temperature, volume, hardness, 
texture, weight, and finally shape) become “salient” to infants at different stages of their 
development, depending on the degree of motor ability required to execute different types of 
“exploratory procedure” ranging from “static contact” to more complex interactions.27 
Herder’s central premise, then, holds true; although vision and touch are in fact 
neurologically integrated from birth, without experiential application to reinforce the 
connection, they will drift apart. It appears, however, that the critical factor in learning to 
process the material world in early childhood is not tactile contact, but movement.28 
Originally reliant on empirical experiments with reaching and grasping, dropping and 
fumbling, clutching and pulling – and, although Herder does not mention relationships to 
architecture in this context, climbing and slipping and scrambling and tunnelling – we begin 
progressively to assess material attributes such as function, scale, and proximity through 
vision alone, without the need to confirm our assessments tactually. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to mistake abbreviation for substitution. Touch has not been supplanted, but 
rather reconfigured as embodied knowledge, a complex latent memory reactivated as the 
unrealised anticipation of movement: if I grip the cup, if I lower myself onto the chair, if I 
were to embrace this figure or clench these muscles or slide down this colossal limb… 
                                                 
25 Experiments have shown that while infants habituated to a tactile stimulus can recognise the same object 
when it is presented visually, “the reverse is not true”: the newborns tested did not appear to recognise by touch 
a three-dimensional solid with which they were visually familiar. Streri (2005: 334, 338–9); cf. Gallagher (2005: 
65–85, 153–61). 
26 See Jeannerod (1994: 197–9) on the difference between “semantic” and “pragmatic” perception of an object. 
27 Bushnell and Boudreau (1991). 
28 Sheets-Johnstone (2011) 
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The regressive impulse to follow through on these promises of kinetic interaction is 
likewise at work in the fantasy of Pygmalion. Described sensually by Ovid,29 it is the 
sculptor-amator alone who actually touches. Whereas Pygmalion exercises the craftsman’s 
prerogative and lays proprietary hands on his work, the pleasure of beholding sculpture in the 
context of the public gallery, as in Herder’s account, resides in an indefinite deferral of the 
imagined action. It has been suggested that we only become conscious of an anticipated 
movement if the movement itself remains “covert”, i.e. unperformed.30 Ongoing resistance to 
performing the movement therefore etches it into the beholder’s consciousness with the acid 
clarity of frustrated compulsion. And yet, as Daniel Smail has shown, we take pleasure in 
deliberately setting off any such neurochemical transactions.31 
When the properties of three-dimensional matter have been organised into sculpture, 
it is then that this process of aesthetic response is allowed to telescope down (having 
undergone Verkürzung [“abbreviation”]) into the apparently unmediated and disembodied 
recognition of Schönheit proposed by Herder’s opponent Riedel, who dispenses with the 
intermediate haptic filter. In Plastik, Herder applies his theory of sensory synthesis to its ideal 
subject, classical sculpture. “That statues (Bildsäulen) can be seen, no one doubts”, he 
concedes, “but we are entitled to ask whether the originary determination of the notion of 
beautiful form can in fact be derived from the sense of sight”.32 He continues: 
 
The living, embodied truth of the three-dimensional space of angles, of form and 
volume, is not something we can learn through sight (Raum, Winkel, Form, Rundung 
lerne ich als solche in leibhafter Wahrheit nicht durchs Gesicht erkennen). This is all 
                                                 
29 See also Purves; Squire & Platt (both this volume). 
30 Jeannerod (1994: 190). 
31 Smail (2008). See n. 6 above. 
32 Plastik 1.3; Gaisser (2002: 40). All translations of Plastik are from Gaiger (2002) and all emphases original, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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the more true of the essence of sculpture, beautiful form and beautiful shape, for this 
is not a matter of colour, or of the play of proportion and symmetry, or of light and 
shadow, but of physically present, tangible truth (dargestellte, tastbare Wahrheit)… 
Sight destroys beautiful sculpture rather than creating it; it transforms it into planes 
and surfaces (Ecken und Flächen), and rarely does it not transform the beautiful 
fullness, depth, and volume of sculpture (das schönste Wesen ihrer Innigkeit, Fülle 
und Runde) into a mere play of mirrors.  
Plastik 1.3; Gaiger (2002: 40-41). 
 
The essential attributes of sculpture, its Wesen, are given here as Innigkeit (depth, interiority), 
Fülle (fullness, plenitude, voluptuousness), and Runde (roundedness, convexity). Also 
essential, and key to the palpable difference between sculpture and painting, is sculpture’s 
delivery of dargestellte, tastbare Wahrheit (“physically present, tangible truth”). Related in 
one sense to the contemporary view that Nature and the artisans of ancient Greece were in 
identical possession of unselfconscious formal integrity, this observation also expresses 
Herder’s conviction that co-presence with a three-dimensional solid triggers a sensory, hence 
aesthetic, response fundamentally different to that which is triggered by a flat surface, 
however beguilingly decorated.  
The sculpture possesses substance, requiring negotiation as a mutual occupant of 
space. “A sculpture before which I kneel can embrace me”, Herder insists. “It can become my 
friend and companion: it is present, it is there”.33 Unlike a painting, which offers images of a 
subject matter which is, by definition, absent, the sculpture presents an intervention into the 
physical environment of the beholder; even if it is not touched, it could be, and into this 
chasm between actual and potential surges the suspended energy of a curling wave: the 
                                                 
33 Plastik 1.4; Geiger (2002: 45).  
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embrace performed again and again in unbroken stillness, never closing, the endless 
“companionship” undissolved. In his one-sided devotion, the beholder resembles Pygmalion 
adding yet another carnelian, another carnation, pressed against the creamy fleshless bone. 
Herder’s imagined orientation, on his knees as if anticipating a caress – and kneeling, not 
standing, implying veneration – contributes profoundly to the way in which his chosen 
sculpture is permitted to affect him. The physical attitude adopted by the beholder in relation 
to the artwork creates a pas de deux experienced not via the gaze of a spectator but via the 
internal proprioception of the performer: stirring the haptic depths, not glancing off visible 
surfaces. 
 
******** 
 
So if one has the opportunity to exercise this sensory faculty, once one is conscious of its 
operation, how to make the most of the encounter? How, for instance, in a gallery, 
constrained by both convention and physiology, might one conduct oneself to maximise the 
haptic rapport? Herder has a few suggestions. Painting’s illusion of perspective can be 
enjoyed by the viewer who occupies a single standpoint, typically front and centre at a 
distance sufficient to take in the whole canvas at once. Sculpture of the type treated by 
Herder, however, offers no such optimal standpoint, and can only be absorbed if the beholder 
is prepared to incorporate movement into his appreciation of the artwork. He “circles 
restlessly”, moving around so as to take in every possible perspective. The angles from which 
a freestanding sculpture can be absorbed are infinite, and the most infinitesimal adjustments 
in the beholder’s orientation can produce entirely new configurations. Herder’s Liebhaber 
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(art lover) performs his circuits “sunk deep in contemplation” (tiefgesenkt), alert to nuance, 
cultivating kinetic engagement as a deliberate alternative to static inertia.34  
Once this freewheeling, mobile point of view has been attained, establishing what 
Zuckert terms a “nonperspectival grasp” of the artwork,35 something more is needed to 
convert the resulting fragmented visual images into a composite haptic entity. “When I have 
described the whole circumcircle, I have perceived nothing more than a polygon composed of 
many small sides and angles”, Herder observes.36 Each individual facet might be very pretty, 
but their unintegrated compilation lacks cohesion, the very Innigkeit (interiority) and Fülle 
(fullness) that make sculpture a sensual medium. In order to synthesise this series of optical 
snapshots, the beholder must apply embodied knowledge to generate a three-dimensional 
compound based on sense memories of touch.  
It is perhaps in this phase that Herder’s beholder, cast in the role of Winckelmann 
contemplating his beloved Belvedere Apollo, ceases his circling. Although he seems to be 
standing still, his inner sense of movement continues to flow (Er scheint auf einem ewigen 
Punkte zu stehen, und nichts ist weniger):37 
 
He adopts as many viewpoints as he can, changing his perspective from one moment 
to the next so that he avoids sharply defined surfaces. To this end he gently glides 
only around the contours of the body (gleitet er nur in der Umfläche des Körpers 
sanft umhin), changes his position, moves from one spot to another and then back 
again; he follows the line that unfolds and runs back on itself (er folgt der in sich 
selbst umherlaufenden Linie), the line that forms bodies and here, with its gentle 
declivities, forms the beauty of the body standing before him. 
                                                 
34 Ibid 1.2; Geiger (2002: 41). 
35 Zuckert (2009: 288). 
36 KW4, 2.3; Moore (2006: 217). 
37 “He seems to stand in a fixed position, but nothing could be further from the truth.” 
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KW4, 2.3; Moore (2006: 218-19). 
 
Movement through space, which liberated the beholder from a fixed position and showed him 
the sculpture as a body whose constant rotation mirrors his own, has given way to a virtual 
traversal of the statue’s topography. The gaze and the proprioceptive self, the kinaesphere, 
are elided: he glides (gleitet), he flows effortlessly all around the elegant contours of the 
figure before him. The performance of movement has been succeeded by the sensation of 
movement, as flight succeeds take-off, creating a giddy discrepancy between how the 
beholder appears to an external observer – pale and frozen, like a statue of himself – and the 
inward dance that sweeps him around the frictionless bodyscape of stone. He avoids sharp 
edges (scharfe, bestimmte Fläche) that might occasion a sudden skid or drop. Scale becomes 
warped  as he traverses the sculpture in kinaesthetic close-up at odds with the limiting frame 
of the rational gaze.  
 Architecture provides Herder with a life-sized apparatus for exercising the same 
haptic faculties. Having absorbed the constituent components of a building, “from the 
elementary and simplest column to the richest diversity of its parts”, Herder’s beholder 
begins to experience the familiar vertiginous slide into virtual traversal: “You will ascend 
from the symmetry of two columns to their arch and from there to the palace in its entirety 
(alsdann von der Symmetrie zweener Säulen zu ihrem Bogen hinaufsteigen und von da zum 
Pallaste in seinem ganzen Bilde)”, Herder predicts, “then glide down facades and rows of 
columns (dann Seiten und Säulenreihen fliegen)”.38 Although not mentioned in this context, 
the soaring “glide” around the columns must surely be predicated, as in the case of sculpture, 
on a kinetic impression of the palace’s dimensions acquired through the contemplative action 
of walking and turning. 
                                                 
38 KW4, 2.12; Moore (2006: 280). 
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 Herder’s formulation is affirmed by the observations of Marc Jeannerod concerning 
neural activity during “object-oriented action”. When humans and other primates are 
presented with graspable objects, we perceive these objects not only in terms of their 
semantic identity (“That is a spoon / a coconut / Apollo”) but in terms of their pragmatic 
affordance (“Grip it / smash it / adore it”).39 What Jeannerod’s experiments demonstrate is 
that the same areas of the brain, such as the pre-motor cortex, show identical patterns of 
activation during the actual (“overt”) performance of a motor task and the imagined 
(“covert”) performance of these tasks. In both cases, Jeannerod proposes, we are seeing the 
necessary neurochemical preparation for movement taking place, whether it is followed 
through into performance or inhibited before reaching the muscles: “Covert actions are in fact 
actions, except for the fact that they are not executed”.40 The significance of Jeannerod’s 
theory for Herder is twofold. First, if sculpture (like any other three-dimensional object) is 
perceived not just as representational but as the goal of various kinetic affordances, the art-
form’s haptic quality resides in its instigation of these covert actions. Second, as mentioned 
above, Jeannerod suggests that we become conscious of motor imagery only when the action 
is not carried out; otherwise, the preparatory simulation is discharged and awareness 
transferred to the movement itself.41 Sculpture can stimulate a perpetual oscillation of actions 
anticipated and inhibited. I suggest that if the beholder’s somatic attention is focused on 
cultivating this oscillation, the result is Herder’s sense of virtual movement. 
 
******** 
 
                                                 
39 Jeannerod (1994; 2001); cf. Gallagher (2005: 8) for comment. Boden (2000: 295) applies the concept of 
affordances to sculpture (and painting).  
40 Jeannerod (2001: 103). Cf. Berthoz (2000: 17–24). 
41 Jeannerod (1994: 190). 
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Shifting from the mechanisms of perception to the instruments used to train them 
involves discriminating between artworks on the grounds of their haptic effectiveness, and 
not surprisingly, the ancient Greeks were judged superior. For Herder, as for Winckelmann, 
classical sculpture meant white marble. Whiteness signified purity, simplicity, and 
commitment to form without the optical interference interposed by colours. “The essence of 
beauty consists not in colour but in shape”, asserts Winckelmann. “As white is the colour 
which reflects the greatest number of rays of light, and consequently is the most easily 
perceived, a beautiful body will, accordingly, be more beautiful the whiter it is”.42 The 
polychromy of ancient Greek statues is now a well-known fact, that these warriors and 
goddesses were picked out in scarlet and gold, their eyes inlaid, their robes brightly patterned, 
their flesh blooming. Roman portrait statues were likewise painted, and coloured marble 
became a popular material both in sculpture and architecture during the early empire. It has 
recently been argued, however, that Greek bronze prototypes tended to be reproduced at 
Rome from unpainted white marble,43 and it is these reproductions which Winckelmann 
claimed as the substantiation of his ideal Greece.  
For eighteenth-century historians the supposed preternatural whiteness of ancient 
sculpture was incontrovertible, and ideologically indispensable. Herder explores the aesthetic 
implications of the assumption that colour was a distraction alien to sculpture in its most 
perfected state. Unlike shape, dimension, and weight, colour (he maintains) is a property that 
cannot be perceived haptically,44 and therefore should not affect the beholder’s judgement of 
a sculpture’s Schönheit. Becoming prescriptive, Herder’s argument approaches circularity: if 
                                                 
42 Irwin (1972: 118).  
43 Bradley (2009) and Østergaard (2008) argue for ubiquitous polychromy, although as Østergaard (2008: 50) 
admits, ‘next to nothing has been published on the polychromy of Roman marble copies.’ Hägele (2013: 102) 
states that ‘as far as Roman copies of Greek statuary are concerned, white marble was used’, artists exploiting 
texturing techniques such as polishing and drilling instead of paint to create chromatic effects. According to 
Jockey (2013: 66) ‘L’éffacement des couleurs originelles par les copistes romains… constitue un premier pas 
décisif dans ce glissement progressif de la réception de l’art grec vers un ‘achromie’ qui préfigure son 
blanchement futur.’  
44 For an alternative view see Bradley (2013) on ‘colour as an object-centred experience’ (2013: 132). 
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sculpture only (properly) appeals to touch, touch is then the only way to recognise proper 
sculpture, and sculpture if properly done therefore suppresses all extraneous visual factors. 
Herder’s ideal, however, rested primarily on the chalky matt maquillage of plaster casts, and 
the Roman galleries behind them; antiquity stripped of its motley, muted to white.  
 Garments likewise interfere with Herder’s preferred haptic response to the 
representation of human figures. This again derives from Winckelmann’s ascription of nudity 
in classical sculpture to the free and uninhibited lifestyle enjoyed by the inhabitants of 
democratic Athens, an argument which is given an aesthetic spin in Plastik. Clothing renders 
the human body inaccessible, confounding attempts to follow the form of the figure beneath 
and smothering physiological correspondences with sartorial idiosyncrasy. Modern dress, 
with its buckles and braid and corsets and hoops, presents an especially gross impediment. 
The only covering appropriate to the medium – incongruous in depictions of contemporary 
individuals, and hence appropriate only to the productions of antiquity – is what Herder refers 
to as “wet drapery” (nasse Gewänder). This technique maintains the figure’s contours, 
ensuring that “the essence of sculpture remains the slender body, the rounded knee, the 
smooth hip, the swelling grape of the youthful breast”.45 Nudity and drapery, on the other 
hand, are less suited in Herder’s view to the modern medium of painting, where drapery 
stiffens into pompous archaism and nudity lolls around in pornographic lechery.  
 Despite Herder’s concern to quarantine sculptural nudity from sexual overtones and 
protect its sunlit integrity from prurient insinuations, there are undeniably erotic aspects to his 
treatment of ancient artworks. One particularly florid passage concentrates on the Sleeping 
Hermaphrodite (fig. 2): 
  
                                                 
45 Plastik 2.1; Geiger (2002: 50–1). 
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Whoever… has stood before the celebrated Hermaphrodite and has not felt in every 
curve and turn of the body, in everything that he touches and does not touch, a 
Bacchic dream (bacchischer Traum) of hermaphroditism; whoever has not been 
tortured by sweet thoughts and by a pleasure that courses through the entire body like 
a gentle fire; whoever has not felt or perceived (fühlte und in sich gleichsam) an 
involuntary resonance and echo of this same music (Saitenspiel) in himself – such a 
person cannot be made to understand.46 
Herder, Plastik 4.1; Geiger (2002: 80-81) 
 
In this instance, it initially appears that the beholder experiences the Hermaphrodite as a 
desirable other, rather than pursuing the sense of identification that Herder describes 
elsewhere. The figure vibrates in the beholder like a plucked string, the Saitenspiel of its 
attitude awakening complementary echoes and the possibility of dreaming the same 
bacchischer Traum; but the sweet shock of arousal and the slow burn of desire suggest an 
autoerotic fantasy indulged at the expense of the slumbering figure. The Hermaphrodite 
depends precisely on a “nonperspectival grasp” for its effects; approached face-on (that is, 
from the rear), a coy corkscrew twist of the spine conceals its intersex characteristics, but if 
curiosity compels the beholder to follow the slope of the knee around to the front of the body 
(the back of the head), his attempt to resolve this teasing question of gender, and hence gauge 
the propriety of his own reactions, is playfully thwarted. Herder’s prose revels in the 
ambiguities: whose is the body in which the Bacchic dream is felt, that of the figure or of the 
beholder? And whose the body lapped by lambent flames? In displacing his own pleasure 
                                                 
46 Wer je am berühmten Hermaphroditen stand und nicht fühlte, wie in jeder Schwingung und Biegung des 
Körpers, in allem, wo er berührt und nicht berührt, bacchischer Traum und Hermaphroditismus herrschet, wie 
er auf einer Folter süber Gedanken und Wollst schwebt, die ihm, wie ein gelindes Feuer, durch seinen gazen 
Körper dringet – wer dies nicht fühlte und in sich gleichsam unwillkürlich den Nach – oder Mitklang desselben 
Saitenspiels wahrnahm, dem können meine nicht und keine Worte es erkläran. 
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onto the figure, the beholder invokes Pygmalion’s creative dream of anticipated reciprocity. 
But whereas Pygmalion’s desire is for an unattainable Other, the hermaphroditic bacchischer 
Traum liquidates difference, confounding the boundaries between the sexes, between 
sleeping and waking, self and other, image and imagination. 
An alternative to approaching the sculpture as if it were Pygmalion’s bride, as a 
companion to be embraced, is to experience it as a replica of oneself; or rather, to feel oneself 
taking on the attributes of the sculpted figure. What Herder in a passage alluding either to the 
Belvedere Torso or the Farnese Hercules (we are not sure which) calls the “feeling 
imagination” (fühlende Einbildung) enables the sufficiently sensitised beholder to “feel 
Hercules in his whole body and this body in all its deeds” (da fühlet sie den Herkules immer 
in seinem ganzen körper und diesen Körper in allen seinen Taten, KW4, 2.3, 219).47 It is not 
only “the mighty contours of [Hercules’] body” which swell the muscles of a sympathetic 
beholder, but all the labours of which this present muscularity is merely the superficial record 
(fig. 3). We could go deeper. Interiority now comes to signify not only the figure’s three-
dimensional firmness, but also the well of mythological memory it taps. To an extent, of 
course, these memories belong to the beholder and the sculpture simply triggers them, but the 
“feeling imagination”, according to Herder:  
 
…has no limits, knows no bounds. It has put out its eyes, as it were, so that it does not 
merely depict a dead surface; it sees nothing of what lies before it but instead gropes 
its way as if in the dark, is enraptured by the body that it touches, travels with it 
                                                 
47 Herder’s description of the figure in question, including its Arme, die den Löwen erwürget, suggests the latter. 
But if the Torso, then the phrase ‘in his whole body’ may refer to the fragmentary condition of this artwork, 
which consists of the trunk and upper thighs of a mature male. Both works were celebrated in the eighteenth 
century; see Haskell and Penny (1981: 229–32) (Farnese) and (1981: 311–14) (Torso). The Torso receives 
detailed attention from Winckelmann (1964: 292–3). 
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through heaven and hell and to the ends of the earth (wird begeistert von dem Körper, 
den sie tastet, und durchzeucht mit ihm Himmel und Hölle und die Enden der Erde).  
KW4, 2.3.48  
 
As a beholder begins to infer from the hero’s craggy weariness the battles which moulded it, 
its visible surfaces dissolve; captivated, he merges and sinks into kinetic reverie. To travel 
with the body of Hercules: does this mean alongside him, like a blind obsessive sidekick, or 
within him, as his inseparable haptic shadow? The beholder’s immersion in Hercules’ 
physiological history suggests the latter, but Herder’s syntax again permits both possibilities 
to coexist. 
It has been demonstrated that observing the actions of others prompts a motor 
simulation similar to that which is prompted by object affordance. “Each time an individual 
sees an action done by another individual,” explain Rizzolatti and Craighero, “neurons that 
represent that action are activated in the observer’s pre-motor cortex. This automatically-
induced motor representation of the observed action corresponds to that which is 
spontaneously generated during active action.”49 Although anthropomorphic sculpture depicts 
arrested action, its illusion of a moving body may produce similar effects. Herder’s 
contention that haptic apprehension is enhanced by prior tactile or kinetic experience also 
finds support in experiments conducted on dancers in which it was found that mirror neurons 
fire more readily in individuals who had themselves learned to perform the skilled 
movements they were shown.50 Originally acquired through conscious, repetitive practice, the 
                                                 
48 The conceit that sculpture can be perceived in the dark recurs throughout both Plastik and KW4. See Richter 
(1992: 113, 121) on Herder’s consistent characterisation of Gefühl as dunkel (dark). 
49 Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004: 172). It should be noted that while mirror neurons have been used to explain 
other psychological phenomena such as theory of mind and empathy, the original studies concerned only motor 
responses. For a survey of theories concerning internal responses to movement in relation to dance, see Foster 
(2008). 
50 Calvo-Merino et al. (2005). 
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dancer’s complex motor schemata could then be activated, like the haptic responses of 
Herder’s beholder, by visual exposure alone. The representation of movement triggers kinetic 
(“muscle”) memory, which is another term for Jeannerod’s “motor imaging”.51 Both the 
recall and anticipation of movement present as a neural simulation of its trajectory. 
 While idealised figures inspire kinaesthetic emulation, the opposite occurs for 
identical reasons when the beholder is confronted by sculptural depictions of ugliness, death, 
monstrosity, or even realism. Like clothing and colour, repellent subjects such as corpses can 
exert a perverse appeal in the medium of painting, which holds them at a visual distance in a 
similar fashion to Aristotelian mimesis. Herder uses his theory of haptic absorption to explain 
why the same subjects realised three-dimensionally inspire not fascination, but revulsion:  
 
But a sculpture requires that I slowly and blindly feel my way forward, until I register 
a gnawing at my flesh and bones and the shudder of death along my nerves… 
 
[Such subjects] are repugnant when encountered by the feeling hand as it advances. 
Instead of encountering ideas, it encounters horror, and instead of the imitation of 
things that are, it encounters the terrible degradation of that which is no more. 
Plastik 2.3, 56-5752  
 
Just as the gnarled physique of Hercules draws the beholder through the Labours and up to 
the very threshold of Olympus, the liquescence of decomposition sickens him as he feels his 
                                                 
51 Fuster (1994: 208). 
52 Examples include “A ravaged, ugly, or distorted form, Itys torn to pieces, Hippolytus in Euripides’ play, 
Medea contorted with rage, Philoctetes in the worst convulsions of his illness, someone in the throes of death, or 
a decomposing corpse struggling against the worms…” Plastik 2.3; Geiger (2002: 57). Richter (1992: 127-30) 
discusses the paradoxical fear of the body’s materiality, hence its mortality, in Herder’s aesthetic theory. On the 
sense of touch and the aesthetic experience of watching bodies in pain on the Greek tragic stage see Worman, 
this volume.  
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own flesh rotting on the bone. It is as if a form of contamination has occurred, as if the 
representation of death in this most tactile medium has brought the beholder into visceral 
contact with his own unstable materiality.53 It does not appear that Herder had any particular 
sculpture in mind at this point, although it could be pointed out that celebrated works in 
Herder’s own canon such as “Paetus and Arria” and the Pasquino group do depict corpses 
(Fig. 4).54 Such works may be powerful, and their potency may indeed derive from something 
like the aesthetic process outlined in Plastik, but by Herder’s definition they cannot be 
beautiful. Death might be no less effective in arousing the haptic senses, but instead of 
hypnotically unfurling a Bacchic dream or dispatching you on an heroic quest, the same slow 
perusal of sculpted nightmares makes the skin crawl and the stomach revolt, like realising 
your hand has rested on something decayed. Decay, moreover, is soft and implosive, whereas 
for Herder the essence of beautiful sculpture, or sculptural beauty, is tautness and wholeness, 
the kinetic surge that sustains its Fülle, its Innigkeit.55 
 For the same reason, Herder condemns realism in sculpture. Knuckles and kneecaps, 
interrupting sinuous limbs like bulbous outcrops, cause the sweeping gleitflug (“glide”) to 
stumble. Likewise, frizzy hair and prominent veins should be erased, leaving nothing but 
smooth contours.56 Veins, in particular, cause Herder to shudder with graveyard disgust, as 
“the silent sense of touch that feels things in the dark will register the veins as wriggling 
worms” (Plastik 2.2, 54). No reminders of mortality should spoil the ride or disrupt the 
intimacy, and no irregularities should warp the haptic senses to yearn for anything but 
harmony. That Greek sculpture (or those works which at the time were classified as Greek 
                                                 
53 On contamination and touch see Lennon, this volume; on the abject properties of living matter, Grosz (1994) 
and Kristeva (1982). Concerned only with subject matter, Herder does not mention the potentially comparable 
effect of beholding anthropomorphic statues that are broken, mutilated, or defaced. 
54 ‘Paetus and Arria’ is now more commonly known as ‘The Gaul and his wife’. On the eighteenth-century 
identification of this group, see Haskell and Penny (1981: 282–84). 
55 However, twentieth- and twenty-first century artists – Dieter Roth, for example – have incorporated decayed 
or decaying objects into their work.  
56 Plastik 2.2; Geiger (2002: 54–5). This is typical of Herder’s period. A generation later, the Parthenon marbles 
would be extolled for precisely this reason, that they incorporated bones and veins into heroic physiology. 
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sculpture) appeared to embody such harmony most fully was justification, in Herder’s view, 
for affirming its centrality to an aesthetic education. 
 
******** 
 
Beholding sculpture in such a way as to cultivate haptic responses takes effort and practice. 
Herder’s method of reception via touch involves an initial period of approach during which 
the sculpture is scrutinised from every possible angle in order to set the beholder’s body in 
motion – a kind of warm-up – and to create a sense-impression liberated from a fixed-point 
gaze. This is followed by a period of stillness in which motion is suspended but the kinetic 
patterns developed continue to flow. From this state of awareness stem various affective 
possibilities: the beholder either identifies proprioceptively with the sculpted figure, as with 
the Hercules, or perceives it as a desirable other whose embrace is forever deferred. 
Alternatively, he may attempt to recover the bodily sensations of the sculptor responsible for 
hewing such a figure from the stone (Plastik 1.3, 41).  
Although this leads Herder to draw prescriptive conclusions about the optimal type of 
sculpture to practice with, the process he outlines may be applied to any three-dimensional 
object. If an object is approached with heightened somatic attention, it may be possible to 
dilate the moment indefinitely by repeating the pulses of covert motor response. Opposing 
Hogarth’s contention that the S-shaped curve is inherently beautiful, Herder writes that the 
“line of beauty” is meaningless unless it occurs in a solid body: 
 
Even if they only appear on a corset or a saucepan, at least they appear on something 
and so are accessible to another sense, that is to say, accessible first to a sense other 
than the eye. I fully understand that a flickering flame of fire or the surge of the sea as 
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it rises in each wave cannot be grasped as something solid. But this does not mean 
that such things cannot be grasped or touched by the soul (daβ unsre Seele sie nicht 
umfasse, nicht taste). 
Plastik 3.1, 64 
 
In falling back on metaphysical vocabulary, Herder struggles to articulate what it is that 
operates behind the gaze, the sensory faculty that enables touch to be felt in the absence of 
touch: Pygmalion’s sense. The Seele also had particular currency in German philhellenism as 
the site of the Liebhaber’s longing to be (re)united with the unattainable perfection of 
Ancient Greece.57 In the delirious moment when the Liebhaber (“beholder”) grasps a 
sculpture in its nonperspectival entirety, “his soul speaks to it, not as if his soul sees, but as if 
it touches, as if it feels” (nun spricht sie [die Seele], nicht, als ob sie sehe, sondern taste, 
fühle. Plastik 1.3, 41). There is also perhaps an oblique reference here to Aristotle’s De 
Anima. For Aristotle, ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν, ‘the soul is like the hand’ in that the 
hand manipulates tools in the same way as the intellect handles ideas, and each sense presents 
to the soul an εἶδος, an idea or ‘form’ of the objects it senses.58 As discussed by Goldner in 
Chapter 4 of this volume, Aristotle prioritises touch as the sense without which no living 
creature could exist, and the sense by means of which all other senses operate: τὸ γὰρ σῶμα 
ἁπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ‘every ensouled being is a haptic body’ (435a14). Herder’s soul 
could also be called his kinaesphere. He is perceiving sculpture as the memory and the 
possibility of movement. In the moment of haptic reception, stone becomes flesh, and 
Pygmalion learns to dance. 
 
                                                 
57 Billings (2016). 
58 ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ 
αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν (De Anima 432a1-3). 
23 
 
 
Add to bibliography:  
Billings, J (2016), ‘The sigh of philhellenism’ in Butler (ed.), Deep Classics: rethinking 
classical reception, London: Bloomsbury, 49-66. 
 
Bradley, M. (2009), ‘The importance of colour on ancient marble sculpture’, Art History 
32.3, 427-57. 
 
Grosz, E. (1994), Volatile Bodies: towards a corporeal feminism, Bloomington: Indiana. 
 
Kristeva, J. (1982), Powers of horror: an essay on abjection, New York: Columbia. 
 
Østergaard, J. S. (2008), ‘Emerging colours: Roman polychromy revived’ in Panzelli (ed.) 
The Colour of Life: polychromy in sculpture from antiquity to the present, Los Angeles: 
Getty. 
 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011), The primacy of movement (2nd edn.), Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
 
 
 
